



N°366 NOVEMBER 2020

MONTHLY BULLETIN

AGENCE FRANCE TRÉSOR IS TASKED WITH MANAGING THE GOVERNMENT DEBT AND CASH POSITIONS UNDER THE MOST SECURE CONDITIONS IN THE INTEREST OF THE TAXPAYER.

News at Agence France Trésor Economic

General debt-related

Secondary Market Negotiable government debt The French economy and international comparisons

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News at Agence <u>Franc</u>e Trésor

PRESENTATION OF THE FOURTH SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET BILL FOR 2020

The fourth Revised Budget Bill for 2020 was presented to the Council of Ministers on 4 November 2020. The Bill aims to reinforce the support measures for the economic sectors that are hit hardest by the second wave of the pandemic and to roll out exceptional measures to help businesses and assist the most vulnerable. The Bill is based on a forecast of a contraction of 11% in GDP in 2020. It incorporates the fiscal impact of extending the emergency measures for merchants and very small enterprises. It also provides financing for support plans for the tourism, event organisation, culture and sports sectors.


It will increase the fiscal deficit to \le 224.3bn, instead of the 2020 deficit of \le 206.0bn anticipated in the 2021 Budget Bill adopted by the Council of Ministers meeting on 28 September 2020. The central government financing requirement for 2020 now stands at \le 363.0bn, which is \le 18.3bn more than the forecast for 2020 in the 2021 Budget Bill. It remains however lower than the requirement anticipated last July in the previous Budget Bill.

In € billion	2020 Initial Budget Act (28 december 2019)	2020 Revised Budget Act 3 (23 July 2020)	2020 Initial Budget Act 2021	2020 Revised Budget Act 4 (04 November 2020)
Financing requirements				
Redemption of medium- and long-term	136.4	136.2	136.1	136.1
Redemption of medium- and long-term debt (at nominal value)	130.5	130.5	130.5	130.5
Supplementary payments at maturity on inflation-linked bonds	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.6
Redemption of other debts	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
SNCF Réseau - redemption	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7
Deficit to be financed	93.1	225.1	206.0	224.3
Other cash requirements	-1.3	0.7	0.4	0.4
Total	230.5	364.2	344.7	363.0
Financing resources				
Issuance of medium- and long-term debt net of buybacks	205.0	260.0	260.0	260.0
Funds allocated to the Caisse de la Dette Publique to reduce debt	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net change in outstanding short-term government securities	10.0	82.9	42.8	54.7
Change in Treasury correspondents' deposits	6.4	1.8	10.9	15.0
Change in cash available in the Treasury's account	3.6	9.0	11.0	11.0
Other cash sources	3.5	10.5	20	22.3
Total	230.5	364.2	344.7	363.0

Most of the increase in the financing requirement in 2020 compared to the forecast in the 2021 Budget Bill will be financed by issuing more short-term debt (BTFs). This increase remains however lower than the increase anticipated in the previous Budget Bill in July.

Consequently, (i) the increase of short-term government securities outstanding will reach a total of \in 54.7bn in 2020 and (ii) issuance of medium-and long-term debt, net of buybacks, will stand at \in 260bn, which is same amount for 2020 as anticipated in the 2021 Budget Bill as well as in the previous Revised budget Act. The Treasury correspondents' deposits will add another \in 4.1bn to these resources.

As in previous crises, short-term debt has been the means of responding to an unexpected shock to the financing requirement. The outstanding will however remain lower in 2020 than the amount reached during the 2008-2009.



Source : Agence France Trésor

Economic news

USA: FISCAL SUPPORT STILL LIKELY, BUT LIKELY LATER

By Alec Phillips, US economist at Goldman Sachs - 5 November 2020

We continue to expect Congress to approve additional fiscal support in the range of \$1 trillion, but political and vaccine-related developments make this more likely to come in early 2021 than in the lame-duck session of Congress that we expect to wrap up by mid-December.

That said, we expect some additional attempts at reaching an agreement this year. If stimulus passage is pushed into early 2021, the outcome will be more dependent on progress controlling virus spread and distributing a vaccine.

MAIN POINTS:

- 1. We think Congress is likely to approve additional fiscal support, but the political environment and virus situation both complicate the outlook. The political atmosphere is less conducive to a deal than it seemed a week ago. The Georgia Senate runoff elections (Jan. 5, 2021) will determine control of the Senate and are likely to make congressional leaders more risk-averse. As we have noted before, this could make Republican leaders more willing to compromise on fiscal support to avoid claims in the Georgia campaigns that a Republican-majority Senate would be an obstacle to greater fiscal relief. However, there also appears to be an equal and opposite reaction among Democratic leaders, who might be less interested in an agreement ahead of the Jan. 5 elections. Beyond this, it is also very unclear what President Trump would be willing to sign before he leaves office, and the continued disagreement over the election result has made negotiations more difficult.
- 2. The other complication is the recent positive news regarding a coronavirus vaccine. This could obviously reduce the amount of fiscal support that lawmakers believe is necessary, particularly for longer-term issues like state fiscal aid. However, it could also give lawmakers increased confidence that fiscal support will indeed be temporary, which could actually increase support for some short-term programs. Pushing in the other direction, the recent virus resurgence could lead Congress to adopt a somewhat larger relief package and could increase the chances that Congress passes one before adjourning in December.
- **3.** Our base case for additional stimulus remains the same: roughly \$1 trillion in additional fiscal measures, most of which would be spent in 2021. Our forecast includes (1) a renewal of the CARES Act UI benefit duration extension and eligibility expansion and a reinstatement of the extra weekly unemployment benefit (we think it might start at around \$400/week and then phase out by the end of 2021) at a cost of \$175bn, (2) additional business support including another round of PPP loans and tax incentives for hard-hit businesses (\$350bn), (3) a limited amount of state/local fiscal aid channeled primarily through funding for schools (\$250bn), and (4) spending on public health efforts and other areas (\$225bn). At this point, another round of tax rebates looks less likely, in our view.
- **4.** We continue to see two paths for Congress to pass additional fiscal support. Senate Republicans seem likely to make another attempt at passing a fiscal package that is somewhat larger than the roughly \$500bn that Senate Majority Leader McConnell offered several weeks ago. This could lose the support of some conservative Republicans who oppose a larger package, which would then require centrist Democrats to make up the difference to reach 60 votes. This continues to look possible, but the current political atmosphere and vaccine news makes this look less likely than it appeared a week ago.
- **5.** The alternative scenario, which we think has become more likely, is that Congress will add a few targeted items to the upcoming omnibus spending bill that must pass by December 11 to keep the federal government operating. This would most likely involve a short-term extension of various provisions that expire at the end of the year, setting a new deadline for action sometime in Q1. This second scenario would make the outlook for fiscal stimulus more dependent on the outlook for virus spread and, in particular, vaccine distribution. Better-than-expected progress on those fronts would likely lead Congress to pass less fiscal support in Q1, in that scenario.

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NEVER SAY NEVER: EURO AREA POLICY MAKERS SIGNAL CONTINUING SHIFT IN FAVOR OF FISCAL POLICY

By Marco Protopapa, economist at JP Morgan - 12 November 2020

In the last few days, prominent Euro area policy makers have made notable remarks which may pave the way for a more constructive approach to fiscal policy beyond the immediate emergency.

First, ECB President Lagarde in her speech [at this year's ECB Forum on Central Banking, November 11] spelled out in quite some detail the case for a close cooperation of monetary and fiscal policy "when interest rates are already low and private demand is constrained by design" and "when firms and households face very high levels of uncertainty, leading to higher precautionary saving and postponed investment". According to Lagarde, "these are the times when fiscal policy has the greatest impact", and the main purpose of monetary policy in this environment becomes "to minimise any crowding-out effects that might create negative spillovers for households and firms".

An explicit reference to the "paradox of thrift" and to the need to avoid hysteresis effects (via defaults and long-term unemployment) sealed this newly found Keynesian attitude to economic policy in COVID-19 times.

Second, in an interview with the FT, European Commissioner to Economic Affairs Gentiloni reinforced the message about the necessity of expansionary fiscal policy by encouraging member states "to do as much as is needed for as long as needed to support their economies". But, he went further by floating the possibility that the escape clause which temporarily suspended the Euro area fiscal framework for 2020-21 could be extended until 2022, on account of a persisting severe economic downturn.

Of course, both Lagarde and Gentiloni delivered their messages under the vivid impression of the economic damage to be triggered by the new containment measures taken in the region in the face of the COVID-19 second wave. And, while the ECB is entirely in charge of monetary policy (net of eventual divisions in the Governing Council), the EC is much slower, divided and affected by different country attitudes when it comes to the course of fiscal policy. Hence, it is probably too early to assess with any confidence the chances of a more constructive approach to fiscal policy in the region beyond the near term.

But, it is fair to acknowledge that the ongoing healthcare crisis is continuing to produce a major shift in sensitivity about the role of fiscal policy in the key policy making institutions. With a debate on the revisions of the fiscal rules probably delayed until the middle of next year due to the second wave, it is not difficult to imagine a path where disagreement about those revisions may give way to a further year of suspensions of the framework in 2022.

We note that the time when the level of activity will have returned to the pre-virus level is a benchmark suggested by the European Fiscal Board, as a pre-condition to reinstate the rules. According to the latest EC Autumn forecast, the level of activity in 2022 will still be below 2019 in most countries, and well below the pre-crisis trend everywhere. In earlier work, we suggested that, from a macroeconomic perspective, the reinstatement of the (possibly revised) rules should not happen before closure of the output gaps at country level, in order to minimize the risks of hampering still fragile aggregate demand. According to the EC, that metric will still be quite negative in most of the region in 2022


	Euro area a	ctivity metric in 2022
	GDP	Output gap
	% of 2019 GDP	% of potential GDP
EA	98.90	-1.90
DE	100.30	-1.10
FR	98.80	-2.10
IT	96.50	-3.40
ES	96.70	-2.50
NL	98.50	-1.80
BE	98.70	-1.70
IE	103.10	-1.90
PT	98.90	-0.70
GR	98.90	-4.40

Source: European Commission Ameco


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INDICATIVE AUCTION SC	HEDULE							
			Shor	t-term		Medium-term	Long-term	Index-linked
December 2020	auction date	7	14	21	28	3	3	3
	settlement date	9	16	23	30	7	7	7
January 2021	auction date	4	11	18	25	21	7	21
	settlement date	6	13	20	27	25	11	25
			optional aucti	ions				


Source: Agence France Trésor







Source: Agence France Trésor



Source: Agence France Trésor

MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM: PROVISIONAL MATURITY SCHEDULE AT 31 OCTOBER 2020

IN € BILLION

Month	Coupon	Redemption
Nov-20	1.5	20.0
Dec-20		
Jan-21		
Feb-21		16.8
Mar-21	0.1	7.9
Apr-21	11.7	32.9
May-21	7.9	20.5
Jun-21	0.5	
Jul-21	2.4	8.0
Aug-21		
Sep-21		
Oct-21	10.0	37.4


Source: Agence France Trésor





NEGOTIABLE GOVERNMENT DEBT BY GROUP OF HOLDERS IN SECOND QUARTER OF 2020

STRUCTURE IN % EXPRESSED IN MARKET VALUE



Source: Banque de France

(**) figures annually revised Source: Banque de France

NEGOTIABLE GOVERNMENT DEBT AT 31 OCTOBER 2020

IN EUROS

Total stripping activity	58,237,759,6
Average maturity	8 years and 312 da
Total short-term debt	159,695,000,0
Average maturity	131 da

Source: Agence France Trésor


NEGOTIABLE GOVERNMENT DEBT SINCE 2017 AT 31 OCTOBER 2020


IN € BILLION

	End 2017	End 2018	End 2019	End Sept. 2020	End Oct. 2020
Negotiable government debt outstanding	1,686	1,756	1,823	2,015	1.995
of which index-linked securities	202	220	226	218	218
Medium- and long-term	1,560	1,644	1,716	1,848	1,836
Short-term	126	113	107	167	160
Average maturity of the negotiable debt		-			
	7 years	7 years	8 years	8 years	8 years
	296 days	336 days	63 days	12 days	64 days

Source: Agence France Trésor











Source: reporting by primary dealers in government securities, excluding flows arising from the Eurosystem public sector purchase programme





Source: Euroclear



Source: reporting by primary dealers in government securities



SHORT-TERM DEBT AT 31 OCTOBER 2020

ISIN Code	Maturity	Outstanding(6)
	Maturity	Outstanding(€)
FR0125848475	BTF 4 November 2020	5,688,000,000
FR0126310202	BTF 11 November 2020	5,354,000,000
FR0126001777	BTF 18 November 2020	9,626,000,000
FR0126310210	BTF 25 November 2020	4,594,000,000
FR0125848483	BTF 2 December 2020	6,470,000,000
FR0126310228	BTF 9 December 2020	7,331,000,000
FR0126310236	BTF 16 December 2020	9,557,000,000
FR0126310244	BTF 6 January 2021	6,901,000,000
FR0126310251	BTF 13 January 2021	8,020,000,000
FR0126461591	BTF 20 January 2021	4,640,000,000
FR0125848673	BTF 27 January 2021	5,477,000,000
FR0126310269	BTF 10 February 2021	6,617,000,000
FR0125848681	BTF 24 February 2021	6,755,000,000
FR0126310277	BTF 10 March 2021	6,283,000,000
FR0125848699	BTF 24 March 2021	8,170,000,000
FR0126461658	BTF 8 April 2021	1,530,000,000
FR0126001785	BTF 21 April 2021	10,971,000,000
FR0126001793	BTF 19 May 2021	8,329,000,000
FR0126001801	BTF 16 June 2021	9,463,000,000
FR0126310285	BTF 14 July 2021	7,449,000,000
FR0126310293	BTF 11 August 2021	6,688,000,000
FR0126310301	BTF 8 September 2021	8,685,000,000
FR0126461682	BTF 6 October 2021	5,097,000,000

MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM DEBT (MATURING 2020-2023) AT 31 OCTOBER 2020

ISIN Code	Bond	Outstanding(€)	Ind. Coeff.	Face value(€)	Stripped(€)	CAC*
	Maturity 2020	20,018,000,000				
FR0012968337	OAT 0.25% 25 November 2020	20,018,000,000			3,000,000	x
	Maturity 2021	123,496,267,930				
FR0013311016	OAT 0.00% 25 February 2021	16,847,000,000			0	×
FR0013140035	OAT€i 0.10% 1 March 2021	7,891,186,680 (1)	1.04298	7,566,000,000	0	×
FR0010192997	OAT 3.75% 25 April 2021	32,917,000,000			0	
FR0013157096	OAT 0.00% 25 May 2021	20,489,000,000			0	x
FR0011347046	OATi 0.10% 25 July 2021	7,961,081,250 (1)	1.05375	7,555,000,000	0	
FR0011059088	OAT 3.25% 25 October 2021	37,391,000,000			0	
	Maturity 2022	165,128,881,520				
FR0013398583	OAT 0.00% 25 February 2022	28,561,000,000			0	x
FR0000571044	OAT 8.25% 25 April 2022	1,243,939,990			315,888,400	
FR0011196856	OAT 3.00% 25 April 2022	45,897,000,000			0	
FR0013219177	OAT 0.00% 25 May 2022	30,816,000,000			0	x
FR0010899765	OAT€i 1.10% 25 July 2022	22,453,941,530 (1)	1.13101	19,853,000,000	0	
FR0011337880	OAT 2.25% 25 October 2022	36,157,000,000			0	
	Maturity 2023	175,529,813,503				
FR0013479102	OAT 0.00% 25 February 2023	16,070,000,000			0	x
FR0013283686	OAT 0.00% 25 March 2023	39,815,000,000			0	x
FR0000571085	OAT 8.50% 25 April 2023	10,606,195,903			5,337,865,200	
FR0011486067	OAT 1.75% 25 May 2023	43,434,000,000			0	x
FR0010585901	OATi 2.10% 25 July 2023	20,686,617,600 (1)	1.14620	18,048,000,000	0	
FR0010466938	OAT 4.25% 25 October 2023	44,918,000,000			435,085,000	

⁽¹⁾ face value x indexation coefficient (face value if coefficient < 1)

^{*} Like all euro area bonds, the bonds issued after 1 January 2013 have collective action clauses (CACs), which means that they are not fungible with bonds issued prior to this date.



MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM DEBT (MATURING IN 2024 AND BEYOND) AT 31 OCTOBER 2020

Bond	Outstanding(€)	Ind. Coeff.	Face value(€)	Stripped(€)	CAC*
Maturity 2024	132 163 908 850				
					×
·					×
•	` '	1,05915	17 919 000 000	0	×
OAT 1.75% 25 November 2024	38 536 000 000			42 000 000	×
Maturity 2025	162 638 998 878				
OATi 0.10% 1 March 2025	11 859 070 760 (1)	1,04476	11 351 000 000	0	×
OAT 0.00% 25 March 2025	44 618 000 000			0	×
OAT 0.50% 25 May 2025	40 197 000 000			0	×
OAT 6.00% 25 October 2025	30 653 928 118			2 809 064 400	
OAT 1.00% 25 November 2025	35 311 000 000			0	×
Maturity 2026	147 936 000 000				
OAT 0.00% 25 February 2026	22 108 000 000			0	×
OAT€i 0.10% 1 March 2026	4 314 000 000 (1)	0,99367	4 314 000 000	0	×
OAT 3.50% 25 April 2026	44 202 000 000			0	
OAT 0.50% 25 May 2026	40 437 000 000			0	×
·	36 875 000 000			0	×
Maturity 2027	107 291 301 200				
	36 296 000 000			0	×
<u>=</u>		1,11457	21 160 000 000	0	
•	` '	.,	2		
				40 040 000	
		1 04302	12 552 000 000	0	×
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•	` '	1,30667	9 185 144 000		
				0	×
-					
					×
•	` '	1,04554	16 004 000 000		×
				0	×
					×
OAT€i 3.15% 25 July 2032	13 942 581 120 (1)	1,28907	10 816 000 000	0	
OAT 5.75% 25 October 2032	32 162 322 600			10 879 757 400	
OAT 1.25% 25 May 2034	36 541 000 000			0	×
OAT 4.75% 25 April 2035	29 004 000 000			4 310 337 000	
OATi 0.10% 1 March 2036	3 556 000 000 (1)	0,99955	3 556 000 000	0	×
OAT 1.25% 25 May 2036	35 260 000 000			0	×
OAT€i 0.10% 25 July 2036	7 142 607 500 (1)	1,02550	6 965 000 000	0	×
OAT 4.00% 25 October 2038	26 534 000 000			4 704 941 400	
OAT 1.75% 25 June 2039	27 375 000 000			0	×
OAT 0.50% 25 May 2040	9 905 000 000			0	×
OAT€i 1.80% 25 July 2040	14 265 793 230 (1)	1,19409	11 947 000 000	0	
OAT 4.50% 25 April 2041	36 152 000 000			5 933 599 000	
OAT 3.25% 25 May 2045	25 824 000 000			1 057 810 000	×
OAT€i 0.10% 25 July 2047	10 744 195 000 (1)	1,04060	10 325 000 000	0	×
OAT 2.00% 25 May 2048	26 409 000 000			650 900 000	×
					×
OAT 0.75% 25 May 2052	18 736 000 000			211 000 000	×
	16 583 000 000			9 265 318 000	
OAT 4 00% 25 April 2055					
OAT 4.00% 25 April 2055 OAT 4.00% 25 April 2060	16 696 000 000			8 532 504 100	
	OAT 0.00% 25 March 2024 OAT 2.25% 25 May 2024 OAT 6.0.25% 25 July 2024 OAT 6.0.25% 25 July 2024 OAT 1.75% 25 November 2024 Maturity 2025 OAT 0.00% 25 March 2025 OAT 0.00% 25 March 2025 OAT 0.50% 25 May 2025 OAT 0.50% 25 May 2025 OAT 0.00% 25 November 2025 OAT 0.00% 25 November 2025 OAT 0.00% 25 February 2026 OAT 0.00% 25 February 2026 OAT 0.10% 1 March 2026 OAT 0.50% 25 May 2026 OAT 0.25% 25 November 2026 Maturity 2027 OAT 1.00% 25 May 2027 OAT€i 1.85% 25 July 2027 OAT 2.75% 25 October 2027 Maturity 2028 OAT 0.75% 25 May 2028 OAT 0.75% 25 November 2028 Maturity 2029 OAT €i 0.10% 1 March 2028 OAT 0.75% 25 November 2028 Maturity 2029 OAT 5.50% 25 April 2029 OAT 5.50% 25 April 2029 OAT 0.50% 25 May 2029 OAT 0.00% 25 November 2029 Maturity 2030 OAT 2.50% 25 May 2030 OAT€i 0.70% 25 July 2030 OAT€i 0.70% 25 July 2030 OAT 0.00% 25 November 2030 Maturity in 2031 and beyond OAT 1.50% 25 May 2031 OAT€i 3.15% 25 July 2032 OAT 1.75% 25 October 2032 OAT 1.75% 25 Doctober 2032 OAT 1.75% 25 July 2036 OAT€i 0.10% 1 March 2036 OAT 1.75% 25 July 2036 OAT€i 0.10% 25 July 2036 OAT 1.75% 25 July 2036 OAT 1.75% 25 July 2036 OAT€i 0.10% 25 July 2040 OAT€i 1.80% 25 July 2040 OAT€i 1.80% 25 July 2040 OAT€i 0.10% 25 July 2048 OAT 1.50% 25 May 2048 OAT 1.50% 25 May 2048	Maturity 2024 39 850 000 000 001 001 002 002 002 002 002 00	Maturity 2024 33 163 908 850	Maturity 2024 39 839 000 000	Naturity 2024

⁽¹⁾ Face value x indexation coefficient (face value if coefficient < 1)

^{*} Like all euro area bonds, the bonds issued after 1 January 2013 have collective action clauses (CACs), which means that they are not fungible with bonds issued prior to this date.




⁽³⁾ Revised on 28 March 2020, not open to subscription

6.9% 2.0% 9.0%	Sep. 2020 Oct. 2020 Q3-2020
2.0% 9.0%	Oct. 2020
9.0%	
	Q3-2020
0.0%	Oct. 2020
0.2%	Oct. 2020
5.7bn	Sep. 2020
7.7bn	Aug. 2020
5.7bn	Sep. 2020
4.7bn	Aug. 2020
0.35%	27 Nov. 2020
0.53%	29 Nov. 2020
1.20	29 Nov. 2020
24.48	29 Nov. 2020
1	0.2% 5.7bn 7.7bn 5.7bn 4.7bn .35%


	2018	2019	end 2018	of September 2019	r level 2020
General budget balance	-76.91	-96.91	-59.13	-86.16	-137.6
Revenue	313.79	301.07	231.88	212.81	191.2
Expenditure	390.69	397.98	291.01	298.97	328.8
Balance of special Treasury accounts	0.82	4.06	-28.01	-22.85	-23.9
General budget outturn	-76.00	-92.69	-87.14	-109.01	-161.5

Source: Ministry of the Economy, Finance and the Recovery

Sources: Insee, Minefi, Banque de France



Source: Insee



Sources: Eurostat, IMF, Insee



^{*} manufactured products

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